Category Archives: Collective intentionality

Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms

This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective intentionality and norm-following neglect the question how free agents can be brought to collectively intend to x , although x is not in their … Continue reading

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Collective intentionality and collective improvisation

The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror … Continue reading

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Explaining Collective Intentionality

The Construction of Social Reality contains interesting suggestions about the ways in which phenomena of we-intentionality derive from beliefs and desires of social agents. This explanatory trust is in deep tension with Searle’s general view that we-intentionality is a primitive phenomenon. I propose that … Continue reading

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Collective intentionality and socially extended minds

There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We … Continue reading

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An ontology of power and leadership

In this article, I draw upon the social ontologies developed by John Searle, Roy Bhaskar, Margaret Archer, and Tony Lawson in order to distinguish between power and leadership. To do so, I distinguish the different organizing principles behind natural phenomena, … Continue reading

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Social ontology, practical reasonableness, and collective reasons for action

I argue that the ontology of human social institutions and collective intentionality could be anchored in the normative notion of ‘practical reasonableness’ as collective reason for action. This involves the deontic idea of mutuality, accepted rules, and shared attitudes of … Continue reading

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Collective intentionality, evolutionary biology and social reality

The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle”s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that “collective intentionality” is not further analyzable in … Continue reading

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Empathy and Collective Intentionality

Two issues have been at center stage in recent social philosophy, both in the analytic and the continental tradition: on the one hand, the nature of interpersonal understanding, or empathy; on the other hand, the possibility and nature of collective intentionality, shared emotions, … Continue reading

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Collective Intentionality

Collective intentionality is the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values. Collective intentionality comes in a variety of modes, including shared intention, joint attention, shared belief, collective acceptance, and … Continue reading

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From Individual to Collective Intentionality

Book – Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades, it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of … Continue reading

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